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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
ment, and (2) the social need for effective sanitation and safety pro-
grams. To accomplish both of these ends while requiring the type of
warrant traditionally known in the search for evidence of crime was not
possible. The strictness of the "probable cause" standards required in a
search pursuant to criminal investigation would make a warrant diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to obtain. Even if this were possible, such a
method would be unlikely to permit a search of all the buildings in a par-
ticular district-a procedure which is necessary if an area inspection is
to be effective. The Court in Camara solves the dilemma by setting re-
duced standards of "probable cause" to warrant an administrative in-
spection. The Camara solution is reasonable and a long standing constitu-
tional question is finally settled, but the resolution of the practical
administrative problems created by the decision will not be found quickly.
JAMES P. MURPHY, JR.
INSURANCE: LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR REFUSAL TO SETTLE
WITHIN THE POLICY LIMITS. Plaintiff owned a building which was insured
for general liability by the defendant. Plaintiff's tenant fell through a
stairway which was negligently maintained. The tenant, who suffered
severe mental and physical injuries, brought an action against the plaintiff
claiming $400,000 in damages but subsequently offering to settle for $9,000.
Although the insurance policy had a limit of $10,000, the insurer refused
the offer of settlement. The tenant pursued her action against the plain-
tiff and recovered a judgment of $101,000. The insurer paid the $10,000
policy limit and disclaimed further liability. Plaintiff then brought this
action to recover the excess of the judgment over the policy limits from
the insurer. Held, by refusing the resonable settlement offer, the de-
fendant breached its duty to act in good faith and was liable for the entire
judgment against the plaintiff. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967). 1
In the instant case, the insurer paid $116,0002 more than its policy
limit because it refused to settle the claim within the limits of the policy.
This case illustrates the conflict between the interests of the insurer and
insured, which arises whenever an injured party offers to settle within
the policy limits.: Liability insurance contracts require the insurer to pay
only the sums which the law determines the insurer owes to the injured
party.4 Often it serves the insurer's financial interests to refuse to settle
because a subsequent court action may determine: (a) that there is no
'See also Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., Inc., 376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967).
2The insurer paid a total of $126,000: $10,000 policy limits, $91,000 excess judgment,
and $25,000 for mental suffering caused by the insurer's refusal to settle.
'Radcliff v. Franklin National Ins. Co., 208 Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002, 1011 (1956).
lid.
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liability; (b) that there is liability, but less than the settlement offer;
or (c) that there is liability, but on a ground outside the coverage of the
policy.5 The insured, and not the insurer, will be liable for any amount
in which the judgment exceeds the policy limit. The insured's interests
are best protected if the insurer frees him from any financial responsi-
bility by settling within the policy limit.6 The conflict between the in-
sured's interest in having the claim settled prior to trial, and the insurer's
interest in allowing the insured to be sued, becomes apparent when the
settlement offer approaches the policy limit. For example: The injured
sues for $50,000; the insured is covered up to $5,000, and the injured
party offers to settle for $4,500. The insurer could accept the offer and
protect the insured from potential financial liability or it could refuse to
settle and attempt to recover a judgment under $4,500. Since only'$500
separates the settlement offer from the policy limit, the insurer might
decide to risk paying the $5,000 limit in the hope of winning a favorable
verdict. Virtually all of the risk of loss would then fall on the insured
because he would be exposed to a potential excess judgment of $45,000. 7
In attempting to save $4,500, the insurer would be gambling with $45,000
of the insured's money.8
Does an insurer have any duty to accept settlement offers within
the policy limits? The typical liability insurance contract does not im-
pose an express duty on the insurer to accept any offer of settlement.9
Insurance companies have vigorously advocated literal interpretations
of insurance contracts and some courts have held that insurers have no
duty except as expressly provided in the contract. 10 These courts have
strictly interpreted the liability insurance contracts which merely allow
settlement if it seems expedient to the insurer."
A majority of courts recognize that insurance companies owe some
'Tomerlin v. Canadian Indent Co., 39 Cal Rptr. 731, 394 P.2d 571, 576 (1964);
Instant case at 177.
6Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem Co., supra note 5 at 576; Keeton, Liability Insurance
4# Responsibility for Settlement, 67 H.A. L. REv. 1136, 1142 (1956).7Radcliff v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 1011.
'Id. "The indemnity companies . .. are in a position to say to the insured: 'heads
I win, tails you loose.' " Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286,
170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933); 60 YALE L. J. 1037.
'See note 11 infra; Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb. 375, 118 N.W.2d 318, 321
(1962); Duprey v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 43 Misc.2d 811, 252 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378
(1964).
"St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employer's Indem. Corp., 224 Mo. App. 221,
23 N.W.2d 215, 220 (1930); accord, Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 226
F. Supp. 223, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503, 506 (1899); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Dep. Co.,
162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081, 1085 (1961); ef. Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577, 579 (1923).
"Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co. Inc., supra note 1, at 426.
The policy under which the suit was brought stated:
"II. Defenses, Settlement, Supplementary Payments. With respect to such
insurance as is afforded by this policy, the company shall: (a) defend any
suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease, or destruction
and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false
or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient . . ..
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duty to settle despite the specific language of the contract.1 2 The theories
upon which liability is imposed vary widely, however. Some courts
would hold insurers liable if fraudulent refusals to accept settlement
offers could be proven. 13 This reasoning does not depend upon the ex-
press terms of the insurance contract, but rather upon the general
abhorrence which the law has for fraud in any legal relationship. 14 How-
ever, this is the most primitive approach; most jurisdictions do not re-
quire active fraud in order to charge insurers with excess liability. 15
Instead, excess liability has been imposed upon insurers because of either
negligence' 6 or bad faith 7 during settlement negotiations. In some
instances the negligence and bad faith theories have been used without
distinction. 8 A reading of these decisions indicates that any distinction
between bad faith and negligence is semantical rather than factual. 19
The majority rule requires an insurer to give as much consideration
to the financial interests of the insured as it gives to its own interests.20
This duty is imposed on the insurer because, by the terms of the insur-
ance contract, it has the absolute right of control over litigation and
settlement.2' If the insurer refuses to settle without giving the insured
equal consideration, it shall have breached its duty and will be liable for
"2Ivy v. Pac. Auto Ins. Co., 156 Cal App.2d 652, 320 P.2d 140, 145 (1958); Brown
v. Guaranty Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 319 P.2d 69, 71 (1958); Hilker v.
W. Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 204 Wis.
12, 235 N.W. 413, 414 (1931); see generally annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
"3Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 10, at 579; City of Wakefield v. Globe
Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 643, 225 N.W. 643, 644 (1929).
"City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., supra note 13, at 645.
15Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., Inc., supra note 1, at 427 (Colo.); Fetter Livestock
Co. v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 257 F. Supp. 4, 10 (D. Mont.
1966); Jessen v. O'Daniel v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 210 F.
Supp. 317, 326 (D. Mont. 1962), aff'd, National Farmers Union Property & Cas.
Co. v. O'Daniel, 327 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82
Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404, 406 (1957); Comunale v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.
App. 654, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958); Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P.2d
823, 827 (1957); National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okl. 175, 200 P.2d 407, 411
(1948); Radcliff v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 1006 (Ore.); Murray
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 61 Wash.2d 618, 379 P.2d 731, 733 (1963; see also, annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
"For a breakdown of criteria utilized by individual jurisdictions, see Wymore, Safe-
guarding Against Claims in Excess of Policy Limits, 28 INs. COUNSEL GUIDE 44, 49
(1961); annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 169 (1955).
17Id.
"8Id.
"Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Corp., 184 F. Supp 634, 639 (D. Md. 1960); Jessen
v. O'Daniel v. National Farmers Union Property &- Cas. Co., supra note 15, at 326;
Radcliff v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 12, at 1018; Hilker v. Western Auto.
Ins. Co., supra note 12 at 414; Wymore, Safeguarding Against Claims in Excess
of Policy Limits, supra note 16, at 45; Keeton, Liability Insurance t Responsibility
For Settlement, supra note 6, at 1141; 48 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1949).
'United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lembke, 328 F.2d 569, 572 (10th Cir. 1964);
Instant case at 178; Comunale v. Traders 4- Gen. Ins. Co., supra note 15, at 201;
Ivy v. P. Auto Ins., supra note 12, at 146.
'Moore v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 325 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1963);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 1942)
Comunale v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., supra note 15, at 200; Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat 'l
Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 1006; Hilker v. W. Auto Ins. Co., supra note 12, at 414;
Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747, 751 (La. 1964).
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the entire judgment against the insured.2 2 Courts have developed a basic
list of inquiries to aid in deciding whether the insurer discharged its
duty of equal consideration. The following is a representatve compila-
tion of criteria utilized by courts:
(1) whether, by reason of the severity of the plaintiff's injuries,
any verdict is likely to be greatly in excess of the policy limits; (2)
whether the facts of the case indicate that a defendant's verdict on
the issue is doubtful; (3) whether the company has given due regard
to the recommendations of its trial counsel; (4) whether the insured
has been informed of all settlement offers; (5) whether the insured
has demanded that the insurer settle within the policy limits; (6)
whether the company has given due consideration to any offer of con-
tribution made by the insured.23
Before an insurer (an make an informed decision to settle, it must
make an adequate determination of the extent of damage and probable
liability.24 A cogent argument can be made for a finding of bad faith if
the insurer had refused a settlement without having conducted a proper
investigation, if proper research would have revealed a real probability
of an adverse judgment.25 Once an investigation has been made, good
faith requires the insurer to respond in accordance with that investiga-
tion.26 The insurer which refuses to heed the advice of its trial counsel,
who after investigation, advocates settlement, shall have breached its
duty and will be liable for any excess judgment.2 7 Hence, the determina-
tion of breach of duty revolves primarily around the character of the
plaintiff's injuries and the likelihood of an adverse judgment.
It [breach of duty] is most readily inferable when the severity of the
plaintiff's injuries is such that any verdict against the insured is
likely to be greatly in excess of the policy limits, and further when
the facts in the case indicate that a defendant's verdict on the issue
of liability is doubtful. When these two factors coincide, and the
company still refuses to settle, the inference of bad faith is strong.28
While a refusal to settle in spite of a probability of an excess judgment
against an insured is persuasive evidence of breach of duty, it is not
determinative in itself.29 All of the factors30 arc utilized by the courts in
deciding whether the insurer failed to give equal consideration to the
interests of the insured and breached its duty. The ultimate test for the
nPotomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., supra note 1, at 427.
2'Jessen v. O'Daniel v. National Farmers Union Property 4 Cas. Co., supra note 15,
at 326, 327; see also, Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 679, 319 P.2d 69, 75
(1958); annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
21Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657,' 250 S.W.2d 785, 791 (1952).
Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168, 174 (1959);
Hilker v. W. Auto Ins. Co., supra note 12, at 415.
'Royal Transit v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345, 346 (7th Cir. 1948).
'Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., supra note 12, at 75.
'Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Gas. Co., supra note 12, at 75.
nJessen v. O'Daniel v. National Farmers Union Property 4f Gas. Co., supra note 15,
at 327; Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., supra note 12, at 75.
"See text at note 22, supra.
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determination of breach of duty, which presupposes consideration of all
the criteria, was expressed in Radcliff v. Franklin National Ins. Co.:
[T]he controlling rule should balance the risks involved and thereby
cause the insurer in settlement affairs to behave as if it were liable
for the entire judgment that may be eventually entered.31
In order to prevent excess liability, the insurer must act as if there were
no limit on the policy and must be as quick to accept the settlement offer
as if it were liable for the entire judgment in the first instance.3 2 Under
the proper circumstances, after due consideration of the insured's inter-
ests, the insurer can safely refuse to settle within the limits and not be
held for an excess judgment.33
As an extension of the insurer's duty to consider the insured's
interests, it has been occasionally contended that it be held strictly liable
for any excess judgment rendered subsequent to a refusal to settle within
the policy limit.34 In the past, this rationale has been consistently re-
jected by the courts.35 With the possible exception of one case,3 6 courts
have uniformly held that insurers can exercise discretion to determine
whether to settle, and are not compelled to accept offers merely because
they are within the policy limits. 37 In the instant case, however, it was
seriously contended that the insurer be held strictly liable for the excess
judgment merely because it refused to accept the offer to settle within
the policy limit.3 8 Although the court found the insurer liable for a bad
t Radcliff v. Franklin Nat 'l Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 1023; Keeton, Liability Insurance
&. Responsibility for Settlement, supra note 6, at 1136.
"Instant case at 176; Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56
A.2d 57, 60 (1947).
"Two cases which arose in Montana demonstrate that insurers can refuse to settle and
and not incur liability for the excess judgment. In Fetter Livestock Co. v. National
Farmers Union Property &. Gas. Co., supra note 15, the court held that a rejection
based on a proper investigation and consideration of the insured's interests would
not result in liability. In spite of severe injuries to the plaintiff, the insurer's counsel
had advised against settlement. An excess judgment was recovered against the insured
but the insurer was not liable for it. The refusal to settle based on the counsel's
mistaken judgment (no bad faith shown) was not sufficient to predicate liability on
the insurer. In the other case, Jessen v. 0 'Daniel v. National Farmers Union Property
4. Cas. Co., supra note 15, the court found liability on the insurer for the excess judg-
ment. The insurer incurred liability because it failed to heed the advice of its attorney
and because its counsel failed to communicate a settlement offer to the insured.
"Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808, 809 (6th Cir. 1934); Blue Bird
Taxi Corp, v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808, 810 (D.S.C. 1939);
Kingan Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N.E. 348, 351 (1917);
Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity 4. Cas. Co., supra note 10, at 505; Tyger River
Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933).
-Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 34; Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American
Fidelity 4. Cas. Co., supra note 34, at 810; Kingan Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra
note 34, at 351; Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity 4. Cas. Co., supra note 10, at 506.
3The insurer contracted to hold the insured harmless. "If, in the effort to do this,
its own interests conflicted with those of the respondent, it was bound, under its
contract of indemnity and in good faith, to sacrifice its interests in favor of the
respondent.'' Tyger River Pine. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 34, at 348.
'Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra note 19, at 639; American Cas. Co. v.
Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 1951).
'The argument was made that: " [W]henever an insurer receives an offer to settle
within the policy limits and rejects it, the insurer should be liable in every case for
[Vol. 29
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faith refusal to accept the settlement, it did not reject the proposed strict
liability theory. In fact, the court justified tentative acceptance of it.
In light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the
methods by which an insured receives protection under a liability
policy, it may not be unreasonable for an insured who purchases a
policy with limits to believe that a sum of money equal to the limits
of the policy is available and will be used so as to avoid liability on
his part with regard to any covered accident. 89
The manner in which the strict liability theory came to the court's
attention in the instant case indicates that California is interested in the
proposed rule. Strict liability was not mentioned in the report of the case
until it reached the Supreme Court. 40 An amicus curiae injected the first
mention of strict liability. In addition to being favorably impressed by
this argument, the court was influenced by commentators who also advo-
cate strict liability in the settlement situation.4 1 The court concurred
with them that policy rates would increase slightly and the burden on
insurers would remain substantially the same if a strict liability theory
were accepted.42
The language used by the court strongly suggests that California may
accept the proposed rule in the future.
[Miost importantly, there is more than a small amount of elementaryjustice in a rule that would require that, in this situation where the
insurer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer,
which may reap the benefits of its determination not to settle,
should also suffer the detriments of its decision.4
The actual ruling in the instant case did not effect the law in the
area of insurer's excess liability. It was decided on a conventional bad
faith basis. However, the dicta in the case suggests approval of the strict
liability rule. The practical effect of strict liability would be to erase
the policy limit in insurance contracts in certain circumstances. If the
insurer refused to accept a settlement offer within the coverage, the
policy limits would be replaced by liability to the extent of any judg-
ment which the injured party might recover. Even if the proposed rule
were accepted, however, it would not substantially increase the number
of excess judgments against insurers. It would be efficacious only in
circumstances in which the insurer refused to settle but did not breach
its duty to protect the interests of the insured.
the amount of the final judgment whether or not within the policy limit." Instant
case at 177.
"Instant case at 177.
4 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1966).
1118 STAN L. REV. 475, 482-485 (1966); 60 YALE L. J. 1037, 1041 (1951); Insur-
ance-Liability of Insurer For Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 95, 102 (1949); 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 105, 109 (1945).
"Instant case at 177.
"Id.
1967]
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In order to justify such an imposition of liability, it would be neces-
sary to decide that the insurer's exclusive right to control the litigation
carries with it a correlative duty to accept every offer to settle within
the policy limit. Charging an insurer with a strict duty may be justifi-
able in view of the unequal bargaining positions of insurance companies
and the individual insured parties. However, it appears to be stretching
the insurance contract to the breaking point if strict liability is to be
based on an insurance clause which does not express any duty to consider
the insured's interests. In effect the insurance contract would be judi-
cially rewritten so that its effect would be diametrically opposed to its
literal meaning.
PETER MICHAEL KIRWAN
TRIALS: QUESTIONING JURORS ON VoiR DIRE CONCERNING RELATIONSHIP
TO INSURANCE COMPANIES. Plaintiff sued the City of Anaconda for damages
for injuries sustained as a result of a fall on a sidewalk maintained by the
city. Counsel for the plaintiff requested the court to permit the following
question during the voir dire examination of jurors: "Are you or is any
other member of your family, a stockholder in the Glacier Insurance Com-
pany, a Montana corporation, with its main office in Missoula, Montana?"
The court sustained the defendant's objection to that question, but allowed
general questions involving prospective jurors being investors in any insur-
ance company. When these questions were asked, the defendant objected
and moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied and voir dire questioning
continued. Held, this type of questioning on voir dire was prejudicial and
constituted reversible error. Avery v. City of Anaconda, 428 P.2d 465
(Mont. 1967).
The right of trial by an impartial jury is secured to each citizen of
the State of Montana.' The determination of whether a juror is qualified
is usually made during the voir dire examination of the prospective
jurors.2 In the majority of jurisdictions, courts recognize the need for al-
lowing counsel wide latitude in ascertaining jurors qualifications 3 and
counsel is generally allowed to question prospective jurors concerning
their relationship with insurance companies.
The decision in the Avery case reflects the very restricted view that
any injection of the issue of insurance into a trial is reversible error.4
'MONT. CONST. art. 3, §§ 16, 23; Shane v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 37 Mont. 599,
97 P. 958, 959 (1908). "The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an
inseparable and inalienable part of the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by
the Constitution."
'State v. Russell, 73 Mont. 240, 235 P. 712, 715 (1925).
3Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3rd Cir. 1965). ,
'Avery v. City of Anaconda, 428 P.2d 465 (Mont. 1967).
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